University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2011

Justice Jackson and the Second Flag-Salute Case:
Reason and Passion in Opinion-Writing
Douglas E. Abrams
University of Missouri School of Law, abramsd@missouri.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs
Part of the Legal Writing and Research Commons
Recommended Citation
Douglas E. Abrams, Justice Jackson and the Second Flag-Salute Case: Reason and Passion in Opinion-Writing, 36 Journal of Supreme
Court History 30 (2011).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs/736

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Justice Jackson and the Second
Flag-Salute Case: Reason and
Passion in Opinion-Writing

DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS

1. Introduction
In 1943, the Supreme Court handed down West Virginia State Board ofEducation v. Barnette.

With Justice Robert H. Jackson writing for the six-Justice majority, the Court upheld the First
Amendment right of Jehovah's Witnesses schoolchildren to refuse to salute the flag or recite the
Pledge of Allegiance, state-imposed obligations that the children and their parents contended
were acts of idolatry that violated biblical commands. Judge Richard A. Posner has said that
Justice Jackson's effort "may be the most eloquent majority opinion in the history of the Supreme
Court." 2
Barnette reached the Court as the nation
waged global war, a dire moment in history
that Part II of this article describes. For its
high drama and the endurance of its doctrine,
the case continues to engage historians and students of the Court. 3 This article concerns the
singular eloquence pinpointed by Judge Posner
and others. 4 Justice Jackson adroitly balanced
two ingredients-reason and passion-that (as
Part III describes) have marked assessments of
rhetoric and human experience since ancient
times, that guided the nation's Founders and

early Presidents, that have now moved President Obama in both of his memoirs, and that
otherwise continue as dual touchstones frequently applied in law and popular culture.
Few cases summon the high drama
that energized the Court in Barnette during
wartime, but (as Part IV describes) focusing
on reason and passion throughout the opinionwriting process remains a useful judicial compass today. Justice Jackson's blend ofthese two
ingredients, and his mastery of the written language, bequeathed a decision whose bedrock
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West Virginia State Board of Education's resolution requiring all public-school students and teachers to salute
the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance each day followed quickly after Pearl Harbor was attacked.

First Amendment holding, according to Professor Charles Alan Wright, "teems with vivid
expressions and memorable statements" that
still enrich the fabric of the law as statements
of core American values.5

II. "Among the Darkest Times in
Recent Memory"
Barnette's record began in early January of
1942, barely a month after Japan attacked
the Pacific naval fleet at Pearl Harbor. Historian David McCullough recalls these days
as "[a]mong the darkest times in recent
memory." 6 "Hitler's armies were nearly to
Moscow; ... German submarines were sinking our oil tankers off the coasts of Florida
and New Jersey, within sight of the beaches,
and there was not a thing we could do about
it; ... half our navy had been destroyed at Pearl

Harbor. We had scarcely any air force. Army
recruits were drilling with wooden rifles. And
there was no guarantee whatever that the Nazi
war machine could be stopped."
General James H. Doolittle's daring
bombing raid over Tokyo and other Japanese
cities would buoy American morale, but the
raid was still a few months away (April 18).
So too were the first great American victories, in the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 48) and at Midway Island (June 4-7). Without
the reassurance of hindsight available to later
generations who know the war's outcome,
Americans in mid-winter 1942 remained resolute and committed, yet aware that the nation
faced an epic challenge to vanquish the Axis
Powers in total war.
In the weeks following Pearl Harbor, appeals to patriotism summoning young and
old spread quickly from coast to coast. On
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January 9, 1942, the West Virginia State Board
of Education followed a number of other state
and local school boards by passing a resolution that required all public school students and
teachers to salute the flag and recite the Pledge
of Allegiance each day.8 The West Virginia
resolution allowed no exemptions because, the
state board found, "national unity is the basis
of national security." 9
Noncompliance carried draconian punishment. Where West Virginia schoolchildren
refused to salute or recite in their classrooms,
their parents faced imprisonment for violating compulsory education acts and citation
for child neglect, which might cause temporary or permanent loss of custody. 0 The
children themselves faced not only expulsion
from school, but also delinquency proceedings and confinement for "insubordination" in
state reformatories, austere institutions notorious for locking up vulnerable, dependent children in close quarters with murderers, rapists
and other predatory and sometimes mentally
ill adolescent criminals under the supervision
of physically and emotionally abusive guards.

In 1950, one study condemned the nation's
juvenile reformatories as "incompatible with
human dignity,... a black record of human
tragedy, of social and economic waste, of
gross brutality, crass stupidity, totalitarian regimentation ... and a corroding monotony even
deadlier than physical violence." 1
The brunt of statutes and resolutions like
West Virginia's fell heavily on the Jehovah's
Witnesses, a small religious group despised by
many Americans for their sometimes aggressive public proselytizing and for their refusal
to serve in the military or to salute the flag
or recite the Pledge. And for their success in
court. When Justice Harlan Fiske Stone wrote
in 1941 that the Jehovah's Witnesses "ought to
have an endowment in view of the aid which
they give in solving the legal problems of civil
liberties," 12 he was not dispensing gratuitous
praise; he was observing that the Witnesses
had appeared regularly in court to seek the
law's refuge from dominant majorities, and had
frequently won. 13
In 1942, legislators and school authorities
in West Virginia and elsewhere stood on solid

West Virginia parents faced imprisonment if their children did not comply with the flag-salute requirement.
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constitutional ground because only two years
earlier, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the Supreme Court had firmly rejected
religious freedom claims by Witnesses families and held that the First Amendment permitted states and localities to mandate flag
salutes and recitation of the Pledge in the public schools.14 Less than three weeks before
the fall of France to the Nazis, Justice Felix
Frankfurter wrote for the eight-Justice Gobitis majority, and Justice Stone stood alone in
dissent despite Frankfurter's private entreaties
for unanimity.15 "History teaches us," Justice
Stone read from his dissent in open Court,
"that there have been but few infringements
of personal liberty by the state which have not
been justified ... in the name of righteousness
and the public good, and few which have not
been directed ... at politically helpless minorities" such as the Witnesses. 16 Justice Stone rejected "the position that government may, as a
supposed education measure and as a means
of disciplining the young, compel public affirmations which violate their religious con-

science."17
"Few Supreme Court decisions," wrote
one historian, "have ever provoked as violent a
public reaction as the Gobitis opinion." The
decision drew immediate condemnation from
more than 170 leading newspapers and support from only a few, but the swift reaction
extended beyond written words." The decision also unleashed a national wave of vigilantism against the Witnesses, whose refusal
to salute or pledge allegiance to the flag appeared disloyal or even treasonous to Americans who perceived the salute and Pledge as
domestic obligations with war clouds looming and who feared domestic subversion (the
so-called Fifth Column). Witnesses families
suffered beatings, physical intimidation, and
property destruction from mobs, often while
local sheriffs and other law enforcement officers stood watching in evident approval, with20
out intervening to secure the victims' safety.
"Because lawless mobs may have misunderstood [Gobitis's] meaning is not in itself a

33

reason to change it," wrote Justice Jackson's
law clerk in an undated confidential memorandum. 21 Most historians acknowledge, however, that the intensity of the post-Gobitis
brutality surprised and likely shocked Justices who had not anticipated such a bloody
backlash against the small, peaceable religious
group that had summoned their protection. 22
In the wake of Gobitis, as many as 2,000
Witnesses children were expelled from the nation's public schools, and many of their parents landed in criminal court. 23 On October
6, 1942, the special three-judge West Virginia federal district court hearing Barnette
v. West Virginia State Board ofEducation enjoined enforcement of the board's resolution
against more than a half dozen expelled Witnesses children, including Walter Barnett's two
young daughters, who attended Slip Hill Grade
School outside Charleston. 24 The unanimous
panel decision was written by Fourth Circuit
Judge John J. Parker, who would have been
sitting on the Supreme Court except that the
Senate, by the scant margin of two votes, had
refused to confirm him after President Herbert
Hoover nominated him in 1930.25
The three-judge panel recognized that
lower courts ordinarily apply Supreme Court
precedents until the Court itself overrules
them,26 but the panel declined to apply Gobitis, which the Court already appeared on the
verge of rejecting. Judge Parker noted that in
Jones v. City of Opelika (1942), another First
Amendment appeal brought by Jehovah's Witnesses, the Court had distinguished the earlier decision and three members of the Gobitis
majority (Justices Hugo L. Black, William 0.
Douglas and Frank Murphy) had called Gobitis "wrongly decided," 27 Justice Stone's earlier approach in dissent.
"Under such circumstances and believing,
as we do, that the flag salute here required is
violative of religious liberty when required of
persons holding the religious views of plaintiffs," wrote Judge Parker, "we feel that we
would be recreant to our duty as judges, if
through a blind following of a decision which
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Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone (pictured) stood
alone in his dissent
in Gobitis, despite Justice Felix Frankfurter's
private entreaties for
unanimity in the wake
of France's invasion by
Germany.

the Supreme Court itself has thus impaired
as an authority, we should deny protection to
rights which we regard as among the most sacred of those protected by constitutional guaranties." 28
Gobitis dissenter Justice Stone and the
two newest members of the Court, Justices
Robert H. Jackson and Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr.,
seemed poised to join the Opelika trio and
overrule the earlier decision. Jackson's distaste
for Gobitis was known within the Roosevelt
administration while he was U.S. Attorney
General before his appointment to the Court
in 1941.29 When Jackson wrote The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy a few months

before he joined the Court, he cited Gobitis
as inconsistent with the Court's usual "vigilan[ce] in stamping out attempts by local authorities to suppress the free dissemination of
ideas, upon which the system of responsible
democratic government rests." 30 On the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, a few months before Judge Parker
wrote, Judge Rutledge dissented from a panel
decision that upheld the convictions of two
Jehovah's Witnesses for selling their religious
literature on a public street without securing a
license or paying a tax. 31 In an apparent reference to Gobitis, Rutledge lamented that the
Witnesses "have had to choose between their
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consciences and public education for their
children." 32
The Supreme Court periodically overrules prior decisions, but rarely one so freshly
minted as the near-unanimous Gobitis. With
the nation and the world watching, and
with ultimate victory over the Axis by no
means assured, however, Gobitis fell in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-

nette, often remembered as the "second flagsalute case." With unmistakable symbolism,
the Court handed down the new decision on
Flag Day, June 14, 1943.
Barnette left Justice Frankfurter in dissent, together with Justices Owen J. Roberts
and Stanley B. Reed, who tersely noted their
adherence to Gobitis but declined to join the
Frankfurter opinion. 33 Responsibility for explaining the Court's unusual about-face fell
to Justice Jackson, who may have seemed an
unlikely candidate for the role. Justice Stone
had ascended to the Chief Justiceship when
Charles Evans Hughes retired in 1941, and,
by assigning the Barnette opinion to himself,
he could have vindicated his lonely stand in
Gobitis for protecting "freedom of mind and
spirit," an appeal to conscience that one historian says "still ranks as one of the Court's
finest dissents." 34 Whatever the reason for the
assignment, Justice Jackson did not disappoint
the confidence that the Chief Justice placed
in him.
III. Reason and Passion in Historical
Perspective
Barely a week after the announcement of Barnette, Time magazine, under the headline "Blot
Removed," wrote that the Court had "reaffirmed its faith in the Bill of Rights-which,
in 1940 [in Gobitis], it had come perilously
close to outlawing." 35 Justice Jackson accomplished his mission with a majority opinion
that balanced reason and passion, twin guideposts familiar to historians and observers of
contemporary American political and popular
culture.
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As complementary and sometimes antagonistic forces for assessing performance or behavior, reason and passion hold an imposing
pedigree that now reaches to the highest levels
of our national life. In The Audacity of Hope,
Barack Obama wrote that "the Constitution envisions a road map by which we marry passion
to reason, the ideal of individual freedom to
the demands of community." 36 Discussing his
own religious upbringing in his earlier memoir, Dreams from My Father, the future President also invoked the two forces, writing that
his grandmother's family "read the Bible but
generally shunned the tent revival circuit, preferring a straight-backed form of Methodism
that valued reason over passion and temperance over both." 37
The synergy of reason and passion dates
from ancient times. Plato asked in The
Republic whether "passion [is] different from
reason," and concluded that "the one ruling
principle of reason [is] that reason ought to
rule." 38 Aristotle said that "[a]ll the acts of
man are necessarily done from seven causes:
chance, nature, compulsions, habit, reason,
passion, desire." 39 "The law," concluded Aristotle, "is reason free from passion."40
The interplay between reason and passion helped shape American political thought
from the nation's earliest years, beginning in
earnest with the writings of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in the Federalist, the essays that throughout 1787 and 1788
advocated ratification of the Constitution by
the thirteen states. FederalistNo. 15, for example, argued strenuously for replacing the weak
Articles of Confederation because "the passions of men will not conform to the dictates
of reason and justice, without constraint." 41
Federalist No. 49 argued for avoiding
frequent future constitutional conventions,
where "[t]he passions ... not the reason, of the
public, would sit in judgment." 42 "[J]t is the
reason of the public alone that ought to controul and regulate the government," the essay
explained. "The passions ought to be con43
trouled and regulated by the government."
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FederalistNo. 50 disparaged the outcomes of
earlier state constitutional conventions, where
"passion,not reason, must have presided." 44
FederalistNo. 55 argued for limiting the
size of the House of Representatives because
"passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from
reason" in a multitude. 45 "[T]he more numerous any assembly may be," FederalistNo. 58
continued, "the greater is known to be the ascendency of passion over reason."46 Federalist No. 63 counted on the smaller Senate to
check the impulses of "the people stimulated
by some irregular passion,... until reason, justice and truth, can regain their authority over
the public mind." 47
Long before George Washington presided
over the Constitutional Convention, impulses
to balance reason and passion guided his personal and public life. As a schoolboy not yet
sixteen, he had fulfilled a school exercise by
copying 110 "Rules of Civility and Decent
Behaviour in Company and Conversation,"
drawn from an English translation of a book
that French Jesuits had compiled in the late
1500s. 48 The 58th Rule left a lasting impression on the future President: "[I]n all Causes
of Passion [ad]mit Reason to Govern." 49
Washington's personal and public life so
fully reflected the Rules that biographers have
regarded them as "formative influences in
the development of his character." 50 In 1783,
for example, General Washington learned that
some of his officers privately planned a meeting to discuss grievances against Congress,
which had not paid them promised salaries
or pensions; his Newburgh Address to the officers successfully dissuaded them from pursuing the plan, which he condemned as "addressed more to the feelings of passions than
51
to the reason & judgment of the army."
Shortly after returning home from
the Constitutional Convention in 1787,
Washington wrote that "[a]ll the opposition to
[the Constitution] is ... addressed more to the
passions than to the reason." 52 Weathering criticism in 1795 that his administration yielded
too much to Britain in Jay's Treaty, Washington

wrote to Attorney General Edmund Randolph
that he looked forward to a "time when passion
shall have yielded to sober reason." 53 In his
Farewell Address in 1796, Washington warned
the nation not to "adopt[] through passion what
reason would reject," 54 advice that he would
repeat during his brief retirement at Mount
Vernon before his death in 1799.
As one of history's great political philosophers and as an opponent of the Federalists
before he became the nation's third President,
Thomas Jefferson likely knew the writings of
the ancient Greeks and surely knew the influence of the Federalistessays. "Let nothing be
spared of either reason or passion," Jefferson
wrote in 1810, "to preserve the public confidence entire, as the only rock of our safety." 56
During the War of 1812, he opposed suspension of U.S. exports as "dictated by passion,
not by reason." 57
In one of his earliest published speeches,
delivered in 1838, twenty-eight-year-old
Abraham Lincoln spoke out against a rash of
lynchings for reflecting a "growing disposition
to substitute the wild and furious passions, in
58
lieu of the sober judgment of the Courts."
"Passion has helped us" by igniting the Revolution that won independence from Britain,
the young Lincoln explained, but unrestrained
passion "will in future be our enemy. Reason,
cold, calculating, unimpassioned reason, must
furnish all the materials for our future support
and defence." 59
Abolitionist leader and former slave
Frederick Douglass wrote more generally
about racial justice in 1855: "There is no relation more unfavorable to the development of
honorable character, than that sustained by the
slaveholder to the slave. Reason is imprisoned
here, and passions run wild."60
In our own time, voices in public-policy
debates frequently urge resort to reason, not
passion.61 The tandem also figures in Presidential messages and, as it has since at least
1837, in House and Senate proceedings. 62 During the House Judiciary Committee's Watergate hearings in 1974, for example, Congress
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member Barbara Jordan of Texas riveted the
nation with her opening statement that "[i]t is
reason, and not passion, which must guide our
deliberations, guide our debate, and guide our
decision." 63
Reason and passion also sometimes constrain judicial action. A civil judgment may be
overturned or reversed on appeal, for example,
when counsel's appeal to juror bias produces
a verdict that "reflects passion rather than reason."64 In cases charging capital crimes or
other serious offenses, courts and commentators regularly summon jurors to return verdicts, judges to impose sentences, and citizens
to retain attitudes that are grounded in reason,
free from passion. 65
In a 2006 commencement address, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice told Boston
College graduates about "five important responsibilities of educated people," including
"the commitment to reason" and "the responsibility to find and follow your passion." 66
A year later, Massachusetts Governor Deval
Patrick told local community college graduates that "[t]he willingness to face down passion and fear with reason and courage ... is the
hallmark of the active citizen." 67
Writers have advanced various formulas
for managing reason and passion. 68 So too

have contemporary philosophers, political theorists, government figures, theologians and biographers, sometimes in the titles of books
whose discussion strives to balance the two. 69
Commentators frequently cite the influence of
calibrated reason and passion on public affairs,
fiction and nonfiction books, movies, plays,
opera, music, and sports. 70 Speaking to the La
Jolla (Calif) Music Society in 2004, for example, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said that law
and music each represent "a fusion of reason
and passion."71
IV. Reason and Passion in Judicial
Opinion-Writing
Throughout our nation's history, much has
been said about the extent to which judges
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can or should let personal feelings affect the
decision making process. 72 The debate continues today as partisans frequently accuse opponents of nominating and confirming "judicial activists," judges who assertedly decide
important cases based on their own personal
predilections rather than by strictly applying
precedents, statutes, and other relevant sources
of law.73
This debate is not the issue here. This article concerns, not how judges reach decisions,
but how vigorous, forceful writing can justify and explain decisions to the lawyers and
parties; to future courts, lawyers, and litigants
under our system of stare decisis; and sometimes also to lay readers in cases such as Barnette, which touch on matters of wider social
concern. The Court had decided Barnette by
internal debate and vote in conference before
Justice Jackson ever put pen to paper.
Judges write opinions, not as private citizens, but as public officers vested by constitution and statute with authority to speak with the
force of law. Formulas do not decide cases, but
in constitutional and nonconstitutional decisionmaking alike, "reason" loosely means application of relevant legal doctrine to the facts,
and "passion" loosely means vigorous, forceful opinion-writing that justifies and explains
the decision's grounding in fact and law.
On a collegial appellate court, the appropriate balance of reason and passion depends
in significant measure on whether the judge
is writing a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion. The majority opinion determines
the parties' rights and obligations while creating precedents and rationales for future cases.
Reason may rein in passion, because the writer
seeking to maintain the majority knows that
our system of precedent means that every paragraph, sentence, and clause-including every
passage tinged with emotion-remains grist
for later citation and potential application. A
later court may find a particular passage to
constitute holding, or else to constitute dictum warranting distinction or some measure
of persuasive effect, but the passage's effect
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as a source of law derives from the court's
constitutional and statutory authority to decide
cases.
Writers of concurring and dissenting
opinions may feel less constrained because
their writings, by themselves, make no immediate law. If the writer so chooses, a concurrence, and particularly a dissent, can rely more
on passion, freer from the need to maintain a
coalition or to exercise circumspection in decision making. Dean Roscoe Pound said that
on a court of last resort, a dissenting opinion
"should express [the judge's] reason, not his
feelings." 74 At one time or another, however,
most of the recent Justices have seen the media
call their dissents "passionate."75
"A dissent in a court of last resort," wrote
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes is, "an
appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which
the dissenting judge believes the court to have
been betrayed." 76 The dissenter's appeal to
posterity stands a better chance, however, with
a disciplined dose of reason than with scarcely
restrained passion. From one era to the next,
Justices such as Oliver Wendell Holmes and
John Marshall Harlan have held the title of a
"Great Dissenter," but their influential dissents
(like Justice Stone's Gobitisdissent) persuaded
future Courts with reasoned legal blueprints
delivered forcefully, and not with unadorned
fist-pounding or shrill emotion.
Barnette demonstrates that focused passion may also invigorate a majority opinion's reasoned analysis. From the outset, every participant in the flag-salute drama sensed
the high stakes at issue. Few claims of right
command greater respect than sincere invocations of religious liberty, and few justifications for government action command greater
force than invocations of national security in
wartime. As the Court fulfilled its constitutional responsibility to apply the First Amendment during the struggle against totalitarian
regimes, Justice Jackson sought to instruct
that Americans would tolerate personal con-

science, even when reverence for the flag was
at stake.
The reasoned instruction would have
fallen flat if Barnette's majority had delivered what then-Professor Felix Frankfurter
had disparaged in 1931 as "the inevitable
lawyer's writing-the dull qualifications and
circumlocutions that sink any literary barque or even freighter, the lifeless tags and
rags that preclude grace and stifle spontaneity." 7 7 Turgid legalese would have decided the
case for the parties, but would also likely
have destined the decision for little more than
swift deposit in the U.S. Reports, barely remembered among later decisions that would
reaffirm similar constitutional propositions.
Instead, Justice Jackson assured Barnette's
immortality by combining reason with passion to dismantle the four specific grounds
that Justice Frankfurter had advanced in
Gobitis.

Gobitis Ground #1: Granting some public school children exemptions from
mandatory flag salute and recitation of
the Pledge of Allegiance would make
the government appear "too weak to
78
maintain its own existence."
Justice Jackson scoffed at the notion that
"the strength of government to maintain itself
would be impressively vindicated by our confirming power of the state to expel a handful of
children from school." 7 9 "Government of limited power need not be anemic government,"
he continued, with passion accompanying the
statement of reason. "Assurance that rights
are secure tends to diminish fear and jealousy
of strong government, and by making us feel
safe to live under it makes for its better support.... To enforce [the Bill of Rights] today
is not to choose weak government over strong
government. It is only to adhere as a means
of strength to individual freedom of mind in
preference to officially disciplined uniformity
for which history indicates a disappointing and
disastrous end." 80
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Gobitis Ground #2: By creating constitutionally based exemptions to mandatory in-school flag salutes, federal
judges would become "the school board
for the country."81
The Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Jackson
countered, "protects the citizen against the
State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of
Education not excepted." 82 Once again, passion took center stage. School boards "have,
of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may
not perform within the limits of the Bill of
Rights. That they are educating the young for
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual,
if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes." 83
Gobitis Ground #3: Because exemptions from mandatory in-school flag
salutes raise disciplinary issues beyond
the competence of federal judges, exemptions should be won at the ballot
box and not in the courts.84
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights," Justice Jackson responded with a firm passionate
voice, "was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections." 85
"[W]e act in these matters," Justice
Jackson continued, "not by authority of our
competence but by force of our commissions.
We cannot, because of modest estimates of our
competence in such specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the function of this Court when
86
liberty is infringed."
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Gobitis Ground #4: The Constitution permits mandatory in-school flag
salutes because "[tjhe ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie
of cohesive sentiment." 8 7
"Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent," Justice Jackson wrote, "soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard." 88
"[W]e apply the limitations of the Constitution," he explained, "with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse
or even contrary will disintegrate the social
organization."
To believe that patriotism will not
flourish if patriotic ceremonies are
voluntary and spontaneous instead of
a compulsory routine is to make an
unflattering estimate of the appeal of
our institutions to free minds. We can
have intellectual individualism and
the rich cultural diversities that we
owe to exceptional minds only at the
price of occasional eccentricity and
abnormal attitudes. When they are so
harmless to others or to the State as
those we deal with here, the price is
not too great. But freedom to differ
is not limited to things that do not
matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to
things that touch the heart of the existing order.90
Justice Jackson closed his opinion with a
reasoned, yet passionate endorsement of individual freedom that has been called "the most
illuminating definition of Americanism in the
history of the Court": "Ifthere is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
91
confess by word or act their faith therein."
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V. Conclusion

A. "The Freedom to Disagree"
Because Justice Jackson was such a graceful
writer, Justice Frankfurter reminisced years
later, "his style sometimes stole attention
from the substance." 92 Justice Jackson's dextrous admixture of reason and passion, however, should not overshadow the durability
of Barnette's First Amendment holding. Gobitis had applied the First Amendment's religion clauses. By ruling instead under the
First Amendment's Speech Clause, Barnette
conferred rights on all claimants who establish entitlement, not solely on claimants
moved by religious belief 93 After more than
sixty years, Barnette remains the basis for the
First Amendment right to "refrain from speaking."94
The distinction between a narrower religious freedom and a broader expressive freedom retains contemporary significance. In
2009, for example, ten-year-old Will Phillips,
a fifth grader at the West Fork Middle School
in Washington County, Arkansas, refused to
stand and join his classmates in reciting the
Pledge of Allegiance. The reason, he said,
was that "I really don't feel that there's currently liberty and justice for all" because
gays and lesbians could not exercise such
rights as the right to marry and the right to
adopt children.95 Much like the Gobitas and
Barnett children, who were about Will's age
when they and their families took their stand
decades earlier, Will endured taunts and harsh
words from some classmates but support from
others. 96

Will Phillips and his supportive parents
made no claim ofreligious freedom, but school
authorities recognized that Barnette squarely
confers the First Amendment right to free expression that the young man sought to exercise.
Asked what it means to be an American, Will
responded, "Freedom of speech. The freedom
to disagree. That's what I think pretty much
being an American represents." 97

B. "[Aln Excellent Writer, Period"
"Solicitor General for life" was the title that
Justice Louis D. Brandeis would have conferred on Robert H. Jackson, who argued
more than four dozen appeals in the Supreme
Court as Assistant Attorney General, Solicitor
General, and Attorney General before his appointment to the Court in 1941.98 But Justice
Jackson leaves a record as much more than
a lawyer who, as Justice Frankfurter put it,
approached the bar "specially endowed as an
advocate." 99
Justice Antonin Scalia calls Justice
Jackson his "hero," someone who "wrote
beautiful opinions and was on the right side of
things, too." 100 Professor Charles Alan Wright
went a significant step further, calling Justice Jackson "the best writer ever to sit on the

Court."o
Justice Jackson achieved his lofty status as
the Court's paramount writer without relying
heavily on law clerks or other ghostwriters to
compose his work or turn a phrase for him. At
President Harry S Truman's request, he took
a leave of absence from the Court in 1945 to
serve as chief United States prosecutor at the
Nuremberg war-crimes trials. A young assistant, assigned to help prepare Jackson's closing
argument to the international tribunal a year
later, felt hurt when the Justice did not use any
of his draft. Only later did the assistant learn
that "Jackson did not like 'ghosts.' He felt that
the words of a speaker or writer should be his
own words and not those of another." 102
In 1957, former Jackson law clerk
William H. Rehnquist attested that "[e]ven a
casual acquaintance with [Justice Jackson's]
opinions during the 13 years he served on the
Court indicates that he neither needed nor used
ghost writers." 103 "The great majority of opinions which he wrote," Rehnquist continued,
"were drafted originally by him and submitted
to his clerks for their criticism and suggestions. Frequently such a draft would be batted
back and forth between the Justice and the particular clerk working on it several times. The
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Robert H. Jackson has been lauded as the best writer ever to sit on the Supreme Court. He did not attend
college; other than apprenticing, his only formal education after high school was one year at Albany Law
School.

contributions of the clerk by way of research,
organization and, to a lesser extent, method of
approach, was often substantial. But the end
product was unquestionably the Justice's own,
both in form and in substance." 104
Six weeks before Barnette, Justice
Jackson had stressed the Court's responsibility to "do our utmost to make clear and
easily understandable the reasons for deciding... cases as we do."10 5 Barnette delivered
on the promise with a clear exposition of reason and passion because Justice Jackson held
a distinct personal advantage. "Good legal
writing," says Professor Richard C. Wydick,
"does not sound as though it had been written
by a lawyer." 106 Justice Jackson left a legacy
of eloquence because, as in Barnette, he indeed did not "write like a lawyer." Professor
Fred Rodell even speculated that Justice Jackson "wrote so unlegally well-with the force

of plain and pointed talk replacing lawyers'
jargon-because he never went through law
school nor won a law degree; indeed, ... he
never even went through college, and one ungraduating year of law study ... was his only
formal education after high school." 107
Justice Jackson was a largely self-taught
writer, and he was both a skilled teacher
and an avid learner. In 2003, Chief Justice
Rehnquist was right that his mentor "was not
simply an excellent legal writer, he was an ex8
cellent writer, period." 0
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